Filed under: Comment | Tags: BRIC, China, currency reserve, diplomacy, economics, G20, G8, Hu Jintao, London Summit, politics, United States

Paola Subacchi Research Director, International Economics, Chatham House
From the London Summit Media Centre
It is the end of the big day and I am travelling from the Excel Centre to a Brazilian café in Acton. The BBC wants to record an interview for Newsnight there, so to add some colour – a long way to go for a couple of soundbites! Does the London Summit make any difference for countries like Brazil? What do the BRICs get out of it?
Perhaps the voice of the developing countries was a bit muted, but surely being around the table is already a big achievement. By delivering a sensible, albeit not exciting, plan of action and showing unity and cooperation, the G20 has qualified to be the key multilateral forum for some years to come. It has de facto replaced the G7 in terms of depth and scope of its agenda – the G7 will continue to be the forum for developed economies. And the developing countries are part of it. However, they will have to move from the background to the limelight and ensure that they are not ‘junior partners’ forever. How can this happen?
Assertiveness is not only a function of geopolitics, but, and foremost, of the ability and willingness to commit resources. This is the big lesson of the London Summit, and the dividing line between ‘senior’ and ‘junior’ partners, or ‘global powers’ and ‘regional powers’. Putting aside some initial reluctance – as in the G20 summit in November 2008 – in London China graduated from regional to global power. It showed political and financial muscles and the appetite to be involved in the global dialogue – with also an interest in developing a closer relationship with Washington.
China is no longer a BRIC, and should no longer put together with countries, like Brazil, that have the potential of becoming large economies and global powers, but they are not quite there. Economic figures clearly show this divide. China’s economy is about US$30,000 bn in volume, has about 10% of GDP current account surplus and approximately US$2,000 bn in FX reserves (estimates for 2008). Brazil’s economy is much smaller (slightly below US$3,000 bn), has about 2% current account deficit and just below US$200 bn FX reserves. This puts China along with the other large economies – US, EU and Japan – and, also, in a special relationship with the US – it is worth noting that President Obama and President Hu Jintao have already agreed to meet twice later this year under the framework of the China-US strategic and economic dialogue.
Political influence and economic power go together, and China seems determined to use both to shape a more global role for itself.
Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.
Filed under: Comment | Tags: China, financial crisis, G2, G20, Gordon Brown, London Summit, United States

Gregory Chin CIGI Senior Fellow
From the London Summit Media Centre
As the global financial crisis has grown into an economic crisis, there is a sense that this time in London, there is more at stake than diplomatic poker. At one level, people are tried of summits. Yet at another, people get it that leaders need to go solve the brewing crisis at the global level.
The financial crisis has turned into one of confidence, beyond financial markets. Commodity prices have fallen. It is affecting peoples’ jobs and livelihood, spreading across the globe. In Africa, fragile states that have depended on exports in niche sectors have seen their trade dry-up. It has become a crisis of real life, fuelling insecurity and uncertainty for households. This explains the surge in expectations for the G20 London. This is one of the differences between the G20 Washington last November and London this time.
In the lead up to London, the leaders themselves seem more engaged – more personally involved. World leaders have become their own sherpas, driving the agenda for the meetings. The host, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, has expended tremendous personal energy and political capital to set the tone and provide leadership for this summit. There is recognition among world leaders that they need to restore confidence and demonstrate there is “someone in charge out there”. The top advisors to the host have called for concrete and realistic goals; a focus on first priorities; and objectives that give a sense of “the beginning of the end” of the global crisis. This has required fighting off the temptation to expand the agenda to include, for example, climate change. The focus has been on economic problem solving. In this regard, G20 London is turning out to be different from recent G8 Summits.
At the same time, the host government has encouraged broader participation at this summit beyond the G20, based on the reasoning that the world is facing truly global problems, and that fixing the global system will require a broader international effort than “the 20”. While such an approach offers legitimacy gains, it also accentuates existing collective action challenges.
The G20 London Summit is expected to bring stronger domestic pledges on ODA commitments to developing countries, as well as increased commitments to the international financial institutions. London is expected to result in a stronger package of regulations, including principles for strengthening national banking and financial regulations, and more robust peer pressure mechanisms via the Financial Stability Forum, Basel, and the International Monetary Fund. However, the word is that there will not be a new global stimulus package. Instead there will be a commitment to monitor closely, and add at the later date if more is needed, or step on the brake to prevent inflation. While the above would represent an advance on the Washington Summit last November, it will likely not be enough.
Here we should note that we are seeing the rise of a new informal “G2” – between the United States and China. And this is the crux of the challenge for the G20. If an “expanded G20” cannot deliver, it will feed Great Power withdrawal into the bilateral track to deal with matters of highest strategic importance. This could mean confining the multilateral track to implementing the decisions made by the Big 2. The result would be a more varied architecture, which in itself, is not a negative outcome. But the reality of an informal G2 should serve as a warning to those who are playing a soft power hand. That expanding the G20 could impair the role of “the 20” in setting the agenda – not to mention its effectiveness.
Disclaimer: This blog is solely intended to spur discussion, while the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI, Chatham House or their respective Boards of Directors.


